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Abstract
This critical literature review begins by giving a short introduction 
to the microfinance industry. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are 
explained and an account is given of their dual performance goals 
of financial performance (‘financial sustainability’) and social 
performance (‘outreach’). While MFIs’ social performance is directly 
aimed at poverty reduction, it is noteworthy that often they fail to 
address poverty (i.e., they fail to deliver outreach). The aim of the paper 
is to answer the following research question: Why have microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) failed to address poverty? In order to establish the 
reason, the first step is to look at how the MFIs are managed and 
controlled, i.e. to examine MFIs’ corporate governance literature. 
This critical literature review was conducted using systematic on-line 
searches in the databases Scopus and Web of Knowledge; the main 
key words used were microfinance, gender, corporate governance and 
performance. The unconvincing nature of the findings of a review of the 
corporate governance literature suggests that another factor should 
be taken into consideration: that of gender; after all, MFIs are mainly 
used by women. The findings from reviewing the microfinance 
literature suggests that microfinance gender literature may explain 
why MFIs have not adequately addressed poverty, but this literature 
consists of a few studies only and further studies are needed. The 
literature on gender in general is more substantial, however. Some 
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account of it will be given in this literature review. The findings of this 
literature review should benefit policymakers on the one hand, who 
are in a position to advance gender equality, while on the other hand 
it should be of use to academics, who can research MFIs in relation to 
gender; further studies of gender in MFIs are encouraged.
JEL: M1; M14
Keywords: Microfinance; gender; women; corporate governance; dual 
performance; outreach; financial sustainability.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to answer the following research question: Why have 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) failed to address poverty? The paper begins 
with a description of the microfinance industry. A formal definition of mi-
crofinance is provided and MFIs’ potential importance in addressing market 
failure will be discussed. Market failure takes place where the poor are kept 
without financial inclusion and continue to remain in poverty (Armendáriz 
and Morduch, 2007). Group lending and peer monitoring are explained. An 
account will be given of MFIs’ dual performance goals of providing good 
social performance (here called ‘outreach’) and sufficient financial perfor-
mance, (here called ‘financial sustainability’; Armendáriz and Morduch, 
2007). Financial performance is called ‘financial sustainability’ rather than 
profit in microfinance literature since profit is usually used for organizations 
where the stress is on profit maximization. ‘Financial sustainability’ is used 
as meaning financial performance that is sufficient to ensure that the organ-
ization will survive in the long run. A brief history of the industry is given, 
followed by an account of the location of MFIs and current state of affairs. 
As the paper addresses performance of MFIs, a closer look at outreach and 
financial sustainability is essential. MFIs are intended to supply a deficiency 
of the market, eventually resulting in poverty reduction. Therefore particular 
importance is attached to MFIs’ social performance or outreach. The research 
method for this narrative critical literature review will be discussed in Sec-
tion 3, Research method. 
The findings from reviewing the microfinance literature suggest that mi-
crofinance gender literature may explain why MFIs have not adequately ad-
dressed poverty. However, only a few studies have been done and more are 
needed. The literature of gender in general is more substantial. Some account 
of it will be given in this review.
The paper is structured as follows. Microfinance institutions (MFIs) will 
be defined, with an account of their history and the current situation of the 
microfinance industry and its dual goals. The methodology part is placed 
before the review of microfinance corporate governance literature, which is 
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followed by a review of gender-related microfinance literature. A short re-
view of the literature on gender in general precedes the conclusion. 
2 The microfinance industry: institutions and goals
2.1 History and current standing
Poverty is not only a humanitarian issue. It is also a threat to any society’s 
stability and therefore addressing poverty in the aftermath of the Second 
World War was a priority (Adams et al., 1984). Development programs were 
created, often in the form of governmental or institutionally subsidized loans 
to the poor. However, low repayment rates, unprofitable investments and 
corruption led to somewhat disappointing results (Adams et al., 1984). 
A more successful attempt to address people’s lack of access to capital 
than by means of the traditional development programs mentioned above 
came with the introduction of the microfinance solution in the 1970s (Yunus, 
2007). An early pioneer in the microfinance field was Muhammad Yunus, 
founder of the Garmeen Bank of Bangladesh and 2006 Nobel Peace Prize Lau-
reate. He began to lend small amounts of his own money to women so they 
could begin small-scale entrepreneurial activities. These women did not 
provide collateral (Yunus, 2007). In substitute for collateral, Yunus used the 
borrower’s network connections to ensure repayment, i.e. group lending 
with joint liability (Yunus, 2007). Garmeen’s lending method also provided 
new dynamic incentives to encourage full repayment. If all of the borrowers 
repaid, they could obtain higher amounts next time they required a loan. 
Furthermore, in order to minimize risk, a very frequent repayment system 
was introduced. The method was fairly successful and allowed a certain 
number of poor women to work their way out of poverty while repaying 
their loans. 
From its emergence in the 1970s, the microfinance industry has grown 
rapidly, reaching more than 13 million clients at the turn of this century. 
Currently, it is estimated that more than 200 million borrowers are now 
involved in the system (Maes and Reed, 2012). More than half of the bor-
rowers are women and two thirds of the microfinance borrowers are ‘very 
poor,’ i.e., they live on a less than USD 1.25 per day. The poverty of the fe-
male borrowers is a pertinent issue since more than 80 per cent of the very 
poor are women (Maes and Reed, 2012). 
Microfinance is a growing industry; in some countries it is growing at 
more than 20 per cent annually (Lascelles and Mendelson, 2011). However, 
despite this growth and coverage, currently only half of the world’s seven 
billion people receive any kind of financial inclusions (World Bank, 2012).
Microfinance institutions are unequally distributed around the globe. 
More than 95 per cent are in the developing world (Maes and Reed, 2012). 
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A little less than half of all these institutions are in the Asia-Pacific region, 
roughly a quarter are in the Sub-Saharan region and a little under 20 per cent 
are located in Latin America (Maes and Reed, 2012). Most of the biggest insti-
tutions are on the Indian subcontinent (Maes and Reed, 2012). 
2.2 Microfinance institutions (MFIs)
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are entities intended to supply a deficiency 
in the market. For traditional lending institutions such as banks, the loans 
sought by potential borrowers are too small for them to break even. MFIs, 
however, do not have to collect costly information (screening of the individ-
ual´s ability to pay the loan back) on borrowers. Furthermore, the borrowers 
are usually poor women, often without financial inclusion and lacking in 
collateral assets (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2007). MFIs are set up to solve 
this issue by providing the poor with loans. The cycle of poverty can be bro-
ken and the poor can be brought into the formal economy, thereby increasing 
financial inclusion. 
A formal definition of the term ‘microfinance’ is provided by Karlan and 
Goldberg (2011) page 20: ‘Broadly speaking, microfinance for loans (i.e., mi-
crocredit) is the provision of small-scale financial services to people who lack 
access to traditional banking service. The term microfinance usually implies 
very small loans to low-income clients for self-employment, often with the 
simultaneous collection of small amount of savings.’ In addition, Karlan and 
Goldberg (2011) name key characteristics often associated with microfinance, 
such as small transactions, loans for entrepreneurial activity, loans without 
collateral, group lending, low-income clients who are often women, a simple 
application process, provision of services in underserved communities and 
market-level interest rates. 
2.3 The dual performance goals – outreach and financial sustainability 
What distinguishes microfinance institutions from financial institutions is 
their dual goals: outreach and financial sustainability. These dual goals dif-
fer significantly from the primary goal of banks – financial performance – as 
well as from those of traditional development organizations, as those institu-
tions do not necessarily have to attain financial sustainability to survive since 
they obtain their funding from other sources such as governments or other 
state-funded organizations (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2007). 
Microfinance institutions are expected to perform well both financially 
and socially. Their financial performance (‘financial sustainability’) is usu-
ally assessed in microfinance literature in terms of classical financial perfor-
mance indicators such as Return on Assets (ROA) or Return on Equity (ROE) 
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2007). The institutions’ social performance 
(‘outreach’) is usually assessed either in terms of its depth or its breadth (Ar-
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mendáriz and Morduch, 2007). Depth of outreach is the average loan balance 
per borrower divided by GNI per capita (i.e. gross national income divided 
by population of each country). The lower the outreach number, the deeper 
or better is the outreach. This measurement of outreach is common in microf-
inance literature: see, for example, Quayes (2012), Mersland and Strom (2009) 
and Hartarska (2005). Breadth of outreach is simply the number of MFIs’ 
borrowers. This measurement approach to outreach does not distinguish be-
tween the poverty levels of the borrowers. In this paper, when outreach is 
referred to, it is depth of outreach. 
Although both outreach and financial sustainability are important for the 
MFIs, it is the outreach aspect that makes MFIs so unique (Strom et al., 2014). 
With better outreach, the needs of the poor are addressed, while they are 
brought out of the cycle of poverty stemming from imperfect market condi-
tions. Arguably, therefore, outreach is the most important mission of MFIs 
(Strom et al., 2014). 
Since a deeper understanding of an organization’s performance (usually 
in terms of financial performance) involves a knowledge of the organization’s 
corporate governance, the next logical step is to examine how corporate gov-
ernance shapes MFIs’ performance. The starting point is a brief review of 
corporate governance literature, followed by a review of the literature that 
deals with MFIs and corporate governance. Although understanding of or-
ganizational performance is usually aimed at financial performance, our first 
step is to take a look at MFIs’ performance in terms of traditional corporate 
governance issues such as agency issues via the ownership (the board) of the 
organization and those who control the institutions on a day-to-day basis 
(managers, CEOs). This is done even though the focus is on social perfor-
mance (outreach), since organizations with social objectives will also benefit 
from how they are governed, i.e., the corporate governance literature also 
applies to organizations with social objectives (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
3 Research method
Before the corporate governance literature is reviewed, the research meth-
od used for this critical review will be discussed. According Hart (2001), a 
critical literature review is a review of already published and unpublished 
material (Hart, 2001). Jesson and Lacey (2006) define a critical review more 
narrowly, as they only include published material. In this paper, a survey of 
properly conducted reviews of literature in high-ranking journals from the 
Scopus and Web of Knowledge databases was carried out. 
Regarding details of how this critical literature review was conducted, 
the internet is becoming a more frequently used means of information gath-
ering in work such as critical literature reviews (Jesson and Lacey, 2006), 
and this was the case here. The keywords used were microfinance, corpo-
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rate governance, gender and performance. These are further listed in a table 
below. This review consists of a review of published papers on MFIs that 
takes into account corporate governance issues (and of the limited number 
of published works on MFIs and gender). Jesson and Lacey (2006) present 
two main methodology types that are often used when critical literature re-
views are conducted: the narrative critical review, i.e. a narrative account 
of already available information, and a systematic review or meta-analysis, 
which is a method or a type of quasi-experiment in itself where the results 
from already published literature are described. This literature review is of 
the former type. 
The motivation or the reason why this critical literature review was con-
ducted was to shed light on the current state of knowledge of the microfi-
nance literature in relation to why MFIs have failed to address poverty. The 
literature on how MFIs are run, i.e., the corporate governance literature in 
relation to MFIs, was therefore reviewed but the findings from this critical 
literature review were far from consistent, as will be discussed in the next 
section. 
Topics and search terms: Microfinance + failure to reduce poverty. 
The review was based on a selection of studies of microfinance top-
ics in accepted academic journals via two large databases: Web of 
Knowledge and Scopus. The key words used in searches were: mi-
crofinance + corporate governance + performance + gender.
Although the papers reviewed here were found in the two databases men-
tioned above, this search covered papers which varied in terms of scope and 
quality and were presented in various academic journals, some of high quali-
ty, others less so. It is possible that a high-quality paper with important find-
ings could be found by other means. The review therefore has its limitations 
in this regard. Furthermore, this critical literature review is what Jesson and 
Lacey (2006) call a narrative critical literature review; but it would be inter-
esting to see results of a systematic critical review or meta-analysis and such 
a study is therefore called for. 
4 The microfinance industry’s inconsistent performance 
solved by women
4.1 Internal corporate governance – Microfinance industry
Literature on corporate governance can be traced back to Jensen and Meck-
ling’s (1976) seminal agency theory, where the agent (usually the manager) 
does not act wholly in the interest of the owner (often called the principal), 
but also out of self-interest. The agent may choose to focus on activities that 
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may lead to the total value of the firm becoming less than it would be if the 
manager were the sole owner of the firm. There is therefore an agency cost, 
and hence, the manager’s interest clashes with the owner’s interest. In addi-
tion, the principal does not have all the information about what the agent is 
doing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Despite these issues, the separation of ownership and control is econom-
ically efficient, as Eisenhardt (1985) explains. If the agent’s performance is 
monitored, evaluated and rewarded, all of which can be done by keeping a 
well-structured and independent board, having independent external direc-
tors, separating the positions of board chair and CEO, imposing age and term 
limits on directors and creating incentives for managers, the agent is more 
likely to manage the organization in line with the owners´ objectives, which 
should be the maximization of the organization’s value. Furthermore, the 
board members can replace members of the management team if necessary 
(Williamson, 1985). 
While traditional corporate governance literature is usually concerned 
with institutions that have solely financial performance goals, according to 
Fama and Jensen (1983), institutions with social objectives can also benefit 
from this body of literature. While non-profit organizations may differ from 
for-profit organizations, in the sense that the former do not have owners who 
are concerned with their profit maximization; nevertheless the agency issue 
between the management, who take the decisions, and the agent still remains 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). In this sense, corporate governance mechanisms 
and principles should also be of relevance for organizations that have social 
goals, such as MFIs. 
Although it may be possible to use traditional corporate governance ide-
ology in order to account for both financial performance and social perfor-
mance, some challenges remain to be dealt with. Corporate governance lit-
erature struggles to explain the reason behind the performance of organiza-
tions in general (Dalton et al., 1998; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) and of MFIs 
in particular (Mersland and Strom, 2009). 
While the literature of corporate governance evolved in the late 1970s and 
developed further throughout the 1980s, the empirical results are anything 
but consistent (Dalton et al., 1998). In a meta-analysis carried out by Dal-
ton et al., (1998) the authors found no correlation between the board´s in-
dependence and performance. In another meta-analysis, Daily, Dalton and 
Channelled (2003) did not find any correlation between independent board 
directors, the duality of the CEO and the board, and the firm’s financial per-
formance. In fact, the authors state that alternative theories or models are 
needed in order to find what within corporate governance may possibly ex-
plain a firm’s performance (Daily et al., 2003). 
The reason why corporate governance fails to explain organizational per-
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formance may, according to Aguilera and Jackson (2003), lie in the shortcom-
ings of the over-emphasis on the agency theory, which fails to take a look at 
interdependencies among the stakeholders of the organization. Renneboog, 
Horst and Zhang (2008) argue along similar lines, suggesting that corporate 
governance should be broader and be termed ‘stakeholder governance’. This 
alternative governance would still include traditional corporate governance 
issues but would also take into account issues related to other stakeholders.
A review of literature on corporate governance vis-à-vis the microfinance 
industry is provided below. As the review will demonstrate, the conclusions 
of the current literature are vague, inconsistent and mixed. 
Campion (1998) undertook a survey in which questionnaires were sent to 
several MFIs in order to collect data and draw conclusions, with the aim of 
making suggestions for the improvement of corporate governance of these 
institutions. The findings suggested that the board and the management 
were, in general, working closely together (Campion, 1998). However there 
were few board meetings and MFIs were often dependent on one key power-
ful person within the institutions, usually the managing director or the chair-
man of the board. Furthermore, board members’ selection was not formal 
and members were often untrained. There were also many internal board 
members, casting doubt on their independence, especially when it came 
to matters of accountability, conflict of interest and innovation (Campion, 
1998). Shortly thereafter, conscious of the MFIs’ corporate governance short-
comings, Labie (2001) called for an improvement in the relationship between 
board and managers and raised the issue of lack of independence, which is 
often an issue for MFIs. 
Rock, Otero and Saltzman (1998) presented a report suggesting that the 
traditional board structures with good corporate governance should be im-
plemented in MFIs. These structures include the separation of the board 
chairman and the CEO, the role of the chairman of the board in relation to 
other board members and the use of board committees. Rock et al. (1998) 
claimed that the microfinance industry worked along lines similar to those 
of other industries, and therefore traditional corporate governance should 
be directly applicable to MFIs. Campion (1998) concurred with this view as 
he found that the governance practice of non-profit and for-profit MFIs had 
more similarities than differences.
The early microfinance literature on corporate governance was followed 
by empirical studies undertaken particularly on corporate governance issues 
in the microfinance industry. The potential benefits of an independent board 
were addressed in one of the earliest studies that examined the relationship 
between the corporate governance mechanism and performance at microfi-
nance institutions (Hartarska, 2005). Hartarska (2005) found a trade-off be-
tween the two microfinance performances, outreach and financial sustaina-
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bility, which was directly related to stakeholders’ representation on the board, 
hence illustrating the value of an independent board with limited employee 
participation. Several studies followed which showed similar results. Nota-
ble studies include those by Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008), Bassem 
(2009) and Mersland and Strom (2009). In a more recent study, which takes 
into account more up-to-date data and is perhaps more accurate in relation 
to the current state of the microfinance industry, Hartarska and Mersland 
(2012) stress on the basis of their findings that MFIs with a board containing 
a larger proportion of insiders are considerably less efficient than those with 
many independent board members. 
Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) and also Hartarska (2005) found if 
the CEO and chairman were the same person (called ‘duality’), MFIs were 
less efficient. While the effect of board independence and duality appears to 
be firmly established, such is not as obvious regarding size of the boards of 
microfinance institutions. Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) argued that 
board size was positively related to financial performance and profitability 
but negatively related to outreach. Hartarksa and Mersland (2012), however, 
claimed that boards with up to nine members can retain their efficiency, but 
thereafter it declines. 
There are also other issues in MFIs’ organizational framework within 
corporate governance that are shown to affect performance, notably their 
managers’ experience. As Hartarska (2005) pointed out, experience is posi-
tively related to MFIs’ efficiency. But while managers’ experience may im-
prove MFIs’ efficiency, such may not be the case if the power of the CEO or 
other managers is examined. Indeed, Galema, Lensink and Mersland (2012) 
showed that powerful CEOs with more decision-making powers than CEOs 
usually have, could make decisions which increased the MFIs’ risk exposure. 
These risk-driven decisions were, according to the authors, causing worse 
financial performance than at institutions that were run by CEOs who were 
not highly risk-seeking (Galema et al., 2012).
Significantly, the findings of Galema et al. (2012) appear to be particu-
larly true for one type of MFI: the non-governmental organization (NGO). 
Mersland (2008) observed that most MFIs are either NGOs or cooperatives 
(COOPs), while policy papers advocate shareholder firms (SHFs). Mersland 
and Strom (2008) found the difference between shareholder-owned MFIs and 
NGOs to be very small and argued that there was no logical reason to trans-
form NGOs into shareholder firms. The authors published another paper in 
which they addressed non-profit microfinance organizations and sharehold-
er microfinance institutions and their effect on financial performance and so-
cial performance; they found no difference (Mersland and Strom, 2009). 
Other research has been carried out on different types of MFIs. For exam-
ple, Perilleux, Hudon and Bloy (2012) found that MFIs allocated their surplus 
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differently depending on their ownership structure. Both non-profit MFIs 
and shareholder MFIs kept their surplus within the institutions and used it 
for self-financing margin rather than transferring it to employees or clients. 
Cooperatives, on the other hand, distributed their margin to their clients 
(Perilleux et al., 2012). 
As for MFIs’ performance in relation to their size, Hudon (2010) claimed 
that well-managed MFIs were often larger than other MFIs. However, Guier-
rez-Goiria and Goitisolo (2011) did not find any relationship between size, 
either as regards profitability or social performance. 
The age of MFIs may also be a decisive factor for outreach depth, as 
Makame (2006) pointed out. However, Hudon (2010) found that well-man-
aged MFIs may not necessarily be older. It is important to note here that MFIs 
may have very different goals for their institutions to undertake, for example 
some are only focused on reaching out to the very poor; some may be heavily 
subsidized and therefore their financial performance will not improve with 
their age, simply because it is not meant to do so. 
Several other corporate governance issues have been focused upon in mi-
crofinance literature. Bonuses to managers have not been shown to accom-
pany better financial performance or better social performance (Hartarksa, 
2005; Bassem, 2009). Transparency has had a good effect on MFIs’ perfor-
mance, as Augustine (2012) claims. The same is argued by Quayes (2012) who 
found that MFIs with a high level of public disclosure tend to perform better 
both financially and socially. 
4.2 External corporate governance – the microfinance industry
To turn to external governance, external corporate governance issues such as 
the competition between MFIs for clients show mixed results (Olivares-Po-
lanco, 2005) as will be discussed below. In an early study, Olivares-Polanco 
(2005) claims that competition in the market tends to lead to larger loan sizes 
and shallower outreach, and that in these cases, the poorest borrowers are 
simply dropped from the microfinance lending portfolio (Olivares-Polanco, 
2005). These findings are contradicted by a finding by Hartarska and Mers-
land, (2012) who observed that competition had no effect on MFIs’ perfor-
mance. D´Espallier and Vanroose (2013) found MFIs to reach more clients and 
were also more profitable in countries where access to traditional financial 
system was limited. In contrast, in countries where there was already an es-
tablished banking system, the existing banks were in competition with the 
microfinance institutions, which pushed them down-market towards the 
poorest customers, hence deepening the outreach, i.e., greater competition 
pushes MFIs down towards the poorest and provides them with loans (D’Es-
pallier and Vanroose, 2013). 
The findings of Assefa, Hermes and Meesters (2013) were similar. They 
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discovered empirical evidence that competition among MFIs deepened their 
outreach (Assefa et al., 2013). Cull et al. (2007) also stated that where there 
was competition in the market, MFIs were pushed toward the poorest bor-
rowers and the outreach deepened. This appeared to be particularly true for 
microfinance banks that relied on commercial funding and those that used 
traditional bilateral lending contracts instead of group lending (Cull et al., 
2007). 
Regulation is another external corporate governance aspect that has been 
touched upon. The earliest research on regulations and their effect on MFIs 
performances, such as that conducted by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) 
and Mersland and Strom (2009), showed no effect. However, a more recent 
study by Hartarska and Mersland (2012) suggested that the relationship be-
tween regulation and performance may be more complicated. They found 
weak support for MFIs in countries with mature regulatory environments: 
there, MFIs reached fewer clients since in these countries poor clients did not 
need to go to MFIs: instead they were more likely to be able to go to a bank 
or other traditional financial institution. But MFIs regulated by an independ-
ent banking authority provided better efficiency (Hartarska and Mersland, 
2012). 
Internationalization may also play a role in MFIs’ performance. Vanroose 
(2008) argued that the microfinance sector was better placed in the ‘better-off 
part’ of the developing world, i.e., in those countries that were not among the 
poorest in the world but were still considerably poorer than rich developed 
countries. Those better-off countries in the developing world are countries 
that have considerably fewer people living in absolute poverty than the poor-
est countries in the world where such living conditions are more common. 
Living on less than USD 1.25 per day is usually defined as absolute poverty 
(Maes and Reed, 2012). Furthermore, Vanroose (2008) argues that MFIs reach 
more clients in countries where international support is present and strong 
(Vanroose, 2008). Ahlin, Lin and Maio (2011) also argued that country issues 
mattered, for example countries that had stronger economic growth were 
a better environment for MFIs to operate in in terms of better repayment 
rates and also countries with more developed financial systems were better 
environments for MFIs in the sense that they had lower default rates, low-
er operating costs and were able to charge lower interest rates. However, 
countries that already had relatively developed manufacturing systems and 
higher workforce participation tended to have less growth in outreach (Ahlin 
et al., 2011). A noteworthy finding about internationalization is provided by 
Mersland and Strom (2011), who found that it directly affected MFIs’ social 
performance for the better. 
Credit risk and credit rating are other factors that have been examined. 
Ayayi (2012) argued that low credit risk is a direct consequence of good im-
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plementation of corporate governance practices, while Beisland and Mers-
land (2012) argued that ratings of MFIs are mostly driven by these institu-
tions’ size, profitability and risk exposure. 
It is important to note, however, that external corporate governance issues 
at microfinance institutions are challenging. Hartarska (2005) claims that ex-
ternal governance issues are unlikely to have a great effect on microfinance 
performances, both as regards their financial and social objectives. Adams 
and Mehran (2012) also claimed that since MFIs were very special institu-
tions, with their dual performance goals of outreach and financial sustaina-
bility, their governance structure may as well appear to be very industry-spe-
cific for the microfinance industry. 
Corporate governance literature is mixed where MFIs are concerned 
(Mersland, 2011). Indeed, the review of the corporate governance and micro-
finance literature above reveals the findings to be anything but consistent, 
both for regulation and management. For regulation, Hudon (2010) found 
that well-regulated MFIs performed well, but Hartarska and Mersland, (2012) 
found such institutions were unable to reach many clients. Hartarska (2005) 
found a limited effect of regulation on performance, while Mersland and 
Strom (2009) found no effect whatsoever. As for the management structure, 
Hartarksa and Strom (2012) found MFIs in which duality was found (where 
the chairman of the board is also the CEO), to be less efficient, but Kyerebo-
ah-Coleman and Osei, (2008) found such MFIs to be more profitable. Mersland 
and Strom (2009) found MFIs with duality able to reach to more borrowers. Fi-
nally, managers’ level of experience tended to have no effect on MFIs’ perfor-
mance according to Hudon (2010), but according to Olivares-Polanco (2005), 
this factor has a positive effect. In fact, such is the diversity of conclusions that 
Mersland and Strom (2009) stated, in a relatively early paper on microfinance 
and corporate governance, that the industry would require other approaches 
in order to explain corporate governance and performance in MFIs.
As shown from the literature reviewed above, the conclusions of the cor-
porate governance literature on performance at organizations in general, and 
for MFIs in particular, is mixed. A different approach, therefore, has to be 
taken in order to account for good performances in MFIs. 
Why are these results inconsistent? Why do MFIs show mixed results 
when outreach is concerned so that overall, MFIs do not seems to be reaching 
out to the poor properly? The reason may be found by looking at gender, as 
those individuals who use these institutions are often women. 
Indeed, Strom et al. (2014) examined gender in microfinance. They argued 
that gender, and most notably the presence of a female CEO, could explain 
some of MFIs’ financial performance. Microfinance gender-specific issues are 
noteworthy, particularly since the microfinance industry is female-specific 
(Strom et al., 2014). The gender aspect in microfinance literature will be ad-
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dressed in the following section to see how it could further advance the liter-
ature of how MFIs are governed. 
4.3 Gender in the microfinance literature
The conclusions of the literature on corporate governance and on gender in 
general are, again, mixed (Bohren and Strom, 2010; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; 
and Dalton et al., 1998). On the one hand, Carter, Simkins and Simpson 
(2003), Erhard, Werbel and Shrader (2003), and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2008) found that gender diversity in the board had a positive effect on or-
ganizational performance and Krishnan and Park (2005) and Shrader, Black-
burn and Iles (1997) found so for management. On the other hand, Adams 
and Ferreira (2009) and Smith, Smith and Verner (2006) found a negative 
relationship, while Chapple and Humphrey (2014) found a weak negative 
relationship between gender diversity and organizational performance. Fur-
thermore, Dwyer et al. (2003) and Carter et al. (2010) found no relationship 
whatsoever between gender and organizational performance.  
However, women may in general often help and support each other (Ea-
gly, 1987), which might result in better social performance and eventually re-
duce poverty. That can be argued by examining the social role theory of gen-
der differences and similarities presented by Eagly (1987), who argued that 
males and females behave in a ‘stereotypical’ manner when they follow their 
social roles. Eagly, Wood, and Dieman (2000) defined these roles as shared 
beliefs of females or males that applies to them and their socially identified 
gender and these social roles are observed by each gender in their personal 
and professional environment. According to these roles, women were found 
to be more concerned with others, more friendly, altruistic and emotional-
ly expressive, while men were found to be more agentic, independent and 
competent in decision-making within organizations (Eagly and Wood, 1991). 
Furthermore, women tend to be more considerate, helpful, friendly, open 
and concerned for the welfare of others, i.e. interpersonally-oriented while 
men tend to be more task-oriented (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). 
Indeed, a new study on microfinance institutions in which women are 
influential does suggest that such institutions provide better outreach to the 
poor (Mengoli, Odorici and Gudjonsson, 2017). As for internal corporate gov-
ernance issues in MFIs, such as in internal monitoring activities, then the size 
of microfinance loans to women is usually smaller, D´Espallier et al., (2013) 
observed, resulting in deeper outreach towards women. Agier and Szafarz 
(2013) argued that although loan approval rates were gender-neutral, the 
loan size to female borrowers on the other hand was lower. Similar results 
had been found earlier by Omri and Chkoundali (2011). Different types of 
MFIs appear to play a role, as argued by D´Espallier, Guering and Mersland 
(2013); MFIs focusing on women are usually NGOs. 
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 As for external corporate governance issues such as the composition 
and gender of groups of stakeholders of MFIs, increasing competition in the 
microfinance market pushes MFIs to loan increasingly to poorer borrowers 
and to women; hence, increasing competition deepens outreach and increas-
es the number of female borrowers (D´Espallier et al., 2013). Women are also 
associated with better repayment, particularly to NGOs (D´Espallier et al., 
2013) and internationalization is associated with more female borrowers 
(D´Espallier et al., 2013). Finally, MFIs receiving international subsidies tend 
to target female customers in larger number than other MFIs (Mersland and 
Urgeghe, 2013). 
Women borrowers are also believed to be associated with better outreach 
(Hermes et al., 2011). The external environment may also favour women, re-
sulting in better outreach. Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Moduch (2013), found 
that greater banking competition led to greater outreach, in particular to 
women. 
Studies of microfinance might benefit from attention to the gender study 
framework in general. While it would be impossible and unfocused to re-
view all such studies in this critical literature review, some recent aspects will 
be introduced in the following sub-section. 
4.4 Relevance of gender studies in general for microfinance studies
In this section, the gender study framework is used in more general terms in 
order to try to understand what direction microfinance research might take. 
Few aspects will be looked into, but it is important to stress that this gender 
literature review is by no means comprehensive; rather, it should be used 
as an idea of how future microfinance studies in relation to gender may be 
moved forward. 
Gender-studies literature indicates that females are more risk-averse than 
males (Ecel et al., 2008; Saren and Wieland, 2016). The reason for this may lie 
in cultural issues, since in western culture risk-taking is seen as a masculine 
characteristic (Nelson et al., 2015). Other branches of studies suggest that it 
has biological explanations (Coates et al., 2010): the amount of testosterone 
is an effective variable causing more risk-taking behaviour among males and 
less by females (Sapienza, Zingales and Maestripieri, 2009). The finding that 
females are less inclined to risk-taking than males has been further estab-
lished in psychological research (Barber et al., 2001), laboratory experiments 
(Powell and Ansic, 1997) and carefully conducted surveys (Dohmen, 2011). 
Microfinance studies would benefit from research related to females being 
more risk-averse than males: this could possibly explain why MFIs have not 
reached the poor as they should have.
Demographic issues may be explanatory. For example, Yao and Hanna 
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(2005) found unmarried males to be the most risk-seeking, then married 
males, followed by unmarried females and finally married females. Hartog 
et al. (2012) found entrepreneurs to be more risk-seeking than company em-
ployees; civil servants were more risk-averse than private-sector employees 
and finally females were less prone to risk than males (Hartog et al., 2012). 
Khan et al. (2007) tried to seek out why white males appear to be less risk-
averse than racial minorities and females, in fact such is the fixation of fe-
males being more risk-averse than males that Olsen et al. (2001) found that 
even if females were trained investors, this had no impact on research out-
comes: female trained investors were still more risk-averse than male trained 
investors (Olsen et al., 2001). It would certainly be interesting to see how gen-
der differences as established in these studies relate to performance by MFIs. 
Studying other aspects of the influence of gender would also benefit mi-
crofinance studies. In an interesting study, Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) 
found that male students’ networks were more closely connected, while fe-
male students were not as well connected. The organization is, according to 
Acker and Joan (1990) a masculine phenomenon. How this all relates to MFIs 
would be worth studying: if females are less connected than males in MFIs, 
this could potentially explain different financial and social performances of 
these institutions. Finally, gender and microfinance studies might benefit 
from further research into gender and tokenism, originally introduced by 
Kanter (1977). 
While further review of gender and its possible effect will not be undertak-
en here, it is important to note that scholars engaged in microfinance studies, 
such as Mersland and Labie (2011) and Hartarska and Mersland, (2012) have 
called for specific approaches at microfinance institutions. The adoption of 
a particular approach in the microfinance industry, such as one that takes 
particular account of gender issues, could explain how MFIs attain their per-
formance goals. Therefore, instead of relying on traditional corporate gov-
ernance approaches to performance, the particular gender issues of the mi-
crofinance industry should be used to explain the performance of the MFIs. 
This should be done by further researching the gender literature. Strom et al. 
(2014) found that gender had little effect on financial performance. The next 
logical step would be to undertake similar research where the focus would be 
on the social performance, outreach and therefore poverty reduction. Further 
research on microfinance institutions in relation to the findings of gender 
literature is desirable. 
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5 Concluding remarks
In this narrative critical literature review the aim was to answer why micro-
finance institutions (MFIs) have failed to address poverty, i.e. failed to pro-
vide good results in terms of their social performance goal ( called ‘outreach’ 
in microfinance literature). So far, several studies of corporate governance 
literature that show mixed and inconsistent results of MFIs’ organizational 
performances have been carried out (Mersland, 2011; Hudon, 2010; Hartar-
ska and Mersland, 2012; Hartarska, 2005; Mersland and Strom, 2009; Kyer-
eboah-Coleman and Osei, 2008). MFIs are different from most other organ-
izations since they are intended both to provide financial performance and 
social performance (outreach). To understand how and why MFIs are not 
reaching their social performance goal properly, another branch of literature 
is suggested for examination: gender literature may better explain the nature 
of MFIs’ performances and further research on the issue is encouraged. 
This critical review has its limitations. No comprehensive review of the 
literature on gender in general would be possible here, as it would be too 
broad. At the same time the combined literature on gender and microfinance 
consists of a few studies only. 
The implications of this work should be of relevance to policymakers 
and academics. Policymakers should now be aware that MFIs should be ex-
amined in relation to gender, as women are after all the majority of their 
clients. Access to finance from MFIs promotes gender equality, particularly 
in the developing world where these institutions are located. Furthermore, 
academics are encouraged to research MFIs in relation to gender. They can 
carry out research by drawing on the vast literature on gender. Although fu-
ture research could potentially improve our understanding of MFIs, why and 
when MFIs will successfully address their outreach goal, to reduce poverty, 
remains an open question. 
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